















POLITICHE PUBBLICHE, SVILUPPO E CRESCITA 
 
Pavia, Università, 7 - 8 ottobre 2004 
 
HETEROGENEITY IN INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE: WHAT SUGGESTIONS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF 
COMPETENCIES TO THE EU? 
 




















società italiana di economia pubblica 
 




Heterogeneity in individual preferences for public expenditure: 
 what suggestions for the assignment of competencies  
to the EU? 
 
Carlo Mazzaferro – University of Bologna and Capp 









Building on the principles of the classical theory of fiscal federalism, the new political 
economy of multi-level government indicates a number of criteria as a guide for the 
efficient assignment of competencies between the European Union (EU) and the member 
states: internalize interregional spillovers; exploit economies of scale; take into account 
heterogeneity of preferences. The aim of this paper is to compare the welfare effects that 
the heterogeneity of individual preferences for public expenditures imply with the 
centralized and the decentralized solutions. In this perspective a median voter mechanism 
of collective decision is assumed to work both at national and EU level. Using data from a 
large international survey (ISSP), a series of econometric models has been estimated in 
order to make individual attitudes for public expenditures representative and comparable 
across different categories and different countries. A measurement of the individual and 
total welfare loss has then been derived  in the cases when the decision upon the level of 
public provision is taken by the national or by the median EU voter respectively. The 
empirical analysis reveals that in some sectors of public expenditure (health, education, 
employment benefits) centralized solution welfare dominates (or is close to dominating) 
decentralization even in the absence of economies of scale and interregional spillovers. 
 
 
Keywords: public expenditure, preferences, European Union 
JEL classification: H50, H77, I00 
Corresponding author: Alberto Zanardi, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di 
Bologna,  email: zanardi@economia.unibo.it 
 




The question of the optimal assignment of competencies between the European Union 
(EU) and member states has been one of the central arguments in the economic and 
political debate during the approval of the European Constitution. EU intervention is 
already quite extensive in a certain number of tasks: monetary policy, internal market 
regulation, agriculture, common trade policy. Other fields of public intervention 
(competition, regional policies, employment and social policies, enterprise policies, equal 
opportunities, industrial policies, consumer policies, environment, research and technology, 
transportation, information and telecommunication, energy) represent cases of shared 
responsibility between the EU and national governments. Lastly, some sectors of public 
expenditure, namely health, assistance, education, cultural policy, are typically allocated at 
national or even subnational level. 
The optimal balance of power between the EU and national states is far from being clearly 
defined either in practice or from a theoretical point of view. An important explanation of 
the current situation may be found in the different speeds at which political and economic 
convergence occurs across countries: “Europe’s fundamental problem is that economic 
integration has preceded the construction of the relevant political institution” (Berglof et al. 
2003). The EU has already many characteristics of a single market, especially in the case of 
goods and services, but political institutions summoned to regulate markets and to supply 
public goods are still missing. As a consequence, there is disagreement over which areas of 
policy making should be transferred to European institutions and also on how much power 
a European political institution should have in each area (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 
1996). 
Economists rely on the theory of fiscal federalism when seeking a solution for the optimal 
assignment of public functions among the EU and national governments. The dispersion 
of preferences across and inside jurisdictions is an important issue of this theory. The 
central aim of this paper is to compare the welfare effects that the heterogeneity of 
individual preferences for public expenditures imply with the centralized and the 
decentralized solutions when a median voter mechanism of collective decision is assumed 
to work at both national and the EU levels. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the issue of optimal assignment 
of political tasks to different levels of government and the solution proposed by the fiscal 
federalism theory. Section 3 focuses on the role of individual preferences on public 
expenditures in the assignment of competencies between the EU and national states. 
Section 4 is the core of our empirical application: data from a large international survey 
(ISSP) are used to estimate a series of econometric models in order to make individual 
attitudes for public expenditures representative and comparable across different categories 
and different countries. In Section 5 a measurement of the individual and total welfare loss 
is derived in the cases when the decision upon the level of public provision is respectively 
taken by the national or by the median European voter and, on this basis, the sectors of 
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public expenditure where the centralized solution welfare dominate decentralization (or the 
opposite occurs) are identified. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2 The classical and the new theory of fiscal federalism: what do they suggest about the assignment 
problem between EU and national states? 
 
Within the dibate on the assignment of public functions to EU and national countries 
economists have built most of their conclusions on principles of the classical theory of 
fiscal federalism (Oates 1972). The theory states that redistributive and stabilization 
functions are more efficiently assigned to central government. The normative prescription 
on allocative functions is more mixed: public goods that provide services to the whole 
population should be allocated to central government, while decentralized governments 
should supply goods whose beneficial effects are locally limited. The advantage of the 
decentralization lies in the ability of local governments to tailor the level of local public 
goods to preferences of populations, which may be differentiated across regions. This very 
general principle allows different interpretations about the optimal degree of 
decentralization of public functions in a country: a public good may be defined as local, 
according to the dimension of the geographical area over which it exerts some positive 
effects and this area may change across time and space. However, the principle clearly 
affirms that public output should be provided “at the lowest level of government 
encompassing, in a spatial sense, the relevant benefits and costs” (Oates 1999). In other 
words, the theory claims that public goods whose effect are locally limited are always 
supplied by a local government at least as efficiently as by the central government. The 
dimension of the welfare gain from decentralization depends, other things being equal, on 
the informational advantage of local governments on citizens’ preferences. 
Oates’s decentralization theorem has been applied in the debate on the optimal allocation 
of public functions between the EU and national states. Currently, the widespread use of 
the principle of subsidiarity in all European treaties witnesses the importance of the 
decentralization principle in the procedure of assignment of functions between the EU and 
national states, at least at an institutional level. Accordingly from a theoretical point of view 
the assignment of public policies should be made after the costs and benefits expected 
from the centralization/decentralization have been traded-off (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 
Alesina, Angeloni and Schucknecht 2002, Buti and Nava 2003; Breuss and Eller 2003). In 
particular, the optimal assignment of public functions between the EU and national 
governments should consider welfare gains and losses expected from externalities, 
economies of scale and heterogeneity of preferences. We will briefly rehearse some 
important topics on these issues: 
i) externalities in the supply of goods and services. The idea is that a centralised solution 
could prevent free riding and under- (over-) supply of goods which emerge if the positive 
effect of public programmes (the burden of tax financing of public spending) falls on 
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economic agents other than those financing them (those benefit from expenditure 
programmes). 
ii) economies of scale. If unitary costs of production are declining a centralized 
solution  increases the efficiency of the unitary supply. 
iii) heterogeneity of preferences. When preferences between jurisdictions are 
heterogeneous, a decentralized provision of public goods is superior with respect to a 
uniform supply at the central level. 
iv) information about citizens’ preferences. Decentralization may offer an advantage in 
order to tailor adequately the level of expenditure to citizens’ preferences. 
Both economies of scale and spillover effects [points i) and ii)] call for a centralization of 
public policies because of cost reduction and because of the possibility of realizing the 
correspondence principle. The hypothesis that large jurisdictions could inherently have a 
more heterogeneous distribution of preferences on the desired level of public policies and 
the idea that local governments have a deeper knowledge of their citizens’ preferences 
move the balance toward  the decentralization of public activities. 
Using these ideas, Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001; 2003) 
show that in presence of a positive external effect of the public expenditure of a country on 
the income  (welfare) of another country, the level of public expenditure chosen by a social 
planner is different with respect to the level of the decentralized solution because the social 
planner decides the optimal level of the public expenditure for the federation by comparing 
benefits arising from economies of scale and externalities, and the costs of harmonizing 
policies in the light of the increased heterogeneity of preferences which accompany a larger 
population. 
Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) define the heterogeneity of preferences as the average distance 
of individuals from the centre, meaning that a country is composed of a group of 
individuals who must agree on a set of policies and are aligned along a spatial or ideological 
line. It is clear that in this case a centralization of public policies that increases the affected 
population size automatically determines greater losses of welfare. On the same topic, 
Alesina, Baquir and Easterly (1999) and Easterly and Levine (1997) support the idea of 
decentralization with the argument that ethnic division is an important vehicle of 
heterogeneity of preferences, an argument which may be quite important in the European 
context. In general it is claimed that a larger population is likely to be less homogeneous 
(Alesina, Perotti and Spolaore 1995; Breuss and Eller 2003) because cultural differences 
between individuals are likely to be positively correlated with the size of the country1. 
As a consequence, on the normative ground, according to this strain of literature the EU 
should focus on policy areas where economies of scale and externalities are large relative to 
the heterogeneity of preferences. If the opposite occurs, assignment should be made in 
favour of national (or even sub-national) governments. Alesina, Angeloni and Schucknecht 
(2002) construct a series of indicators built on the number of legal, judiciary and other non-
                                                 
1 On the other hand, Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) suggest that centralizing policies may induce convergence 
within Europe by the increased degree of homogeneity thus brought about. 
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binding acts, emanating from the EU in order to measure the role of European institutions 
in different policy domains. They find that the action of the EU deviates in many cases 
from the above normative prescription. In some areas, in particular social protection and 
agriculture, the European intervention appears to be overextended, while in other areas 
where economies of scale might exert an important role, in particular defence and foreign 
relations, it appears too limited. In the same paper the authors use as an alternative source 
of information, the 2001 Eurobarometer wave, which concerned the question of the 
assignment of policies between the EU and national states. According to the survey results 
and to a simulated vote of national representatives in the European Parliament, money and 
finance, environment, international relations and certain aspects of citizens’ and social 
protection should result in a shared responsibility. A complete centralization would win 
only for Migration policies. Education, research and culture, Agriculture, Crime, Health and 
Social Welfare should be undertaken at a national level. Ahrens and Meurers (2004) also 
use data from Eurobarometer and study heterogeneity of preferences across old and new 
countries belonging to the EU after the eastward enlargement. They find that heterogeneity 
across countries is expected to increase significantly. Ferrera (1993) uses the 
Eurobarometer survey to study preferences of European citizens on the desired level of 
social policies. He finds a mixed feeling across countries, but also across individuals living 
within each country, on the desired level of public expenditure on social security, health 
and unemployment. In general social protection is highly valued by a large majority of 
Euopean citizens. However country analysis reveals a quite marked variation between the 
maximalist and the minimalist option. On the same topic Boeri, Boersch-Supan and 
Tabellini (2001) find, on a representative survey conducted for Italy, Spain, Germany and 
France, that a majority of citizens oppose cuts to social security and social protection 
expenditures. However they also find that different opinions on the future of the welfare 
state are influenced not only by nationality but also by the economic situation of 
respondents, their labour market state and their age.  
 
 
3. The role of preferences in the assignment of competencies between the Eu and national states 
 
Local governments are closer to their citizens and therefore they will be more responsive to 
their particular preferences on public policies. Starting from this assumption, the classical 
theory of fiscal federalism claims that the superiority of the decentralization is a 
consequence of the ability of local governments to take more account of the tastes of 
members of each community. This is an advantage when the government offers a uniform 
quantity of the public good, but it does not mean that the decentralized solution implies the 
absence of welfare loss from a collective action. As long as preferences are differentiated 
among members of a community, a public good supplied at a uniform level must always 
imply compromises among individuals. Even if the uniform level of the local public good is 
decided by a social planner whose aim is the minimization of welfare losses caused to 
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citizens by their different tastes on that good, the Pareto-efficient solution implies some 
welfare loss. The important point made by the decentralization theorem is that the 
“average” level of the public good, which is supplied by a central government, always 
imposes welfare losses to citizens of a jurisdiction that are at least as great as the welfare 
losses expected by the same citizens if they are allowed to consume the “average” level of 
the same public good set by a local government2. Two important points follow: in terms of 
welfare the centralized solution is equal to the decentralized only if all local governments 
have the same “average” desired level of the public good; and the gain of the 
decentralization increases as long as differences across local communities are larger (Oates 
1972). 
Within the debate upon public functions assignment between the EU and national states, 
Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) and Alesina, Angeloni and Etro (2001) use this framework in 
a slightly different context. In order to emphasize the social cost of the centralization of 
public policies in a federation of national states, they assume that the desired level of public 
policies is constant within each country, i.e. all citizens in a country have the same desired 
level of the public policy. It is clear in this case that, at least from the point of view of 
preferences, the decentralization of public power is always more efficient then the 
centralization solution. An increase in the intervention of the federation is efficient only if 
the cost reduction which centralization brings with it can be used to refund individuals for 
welfare losses they have to accept from a uniform supply. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) 
assume that individuals who are close to each other in terms of preferences would also like 
to form a country together. In this case they also assume that geographical closeness 
implies similar preferences. Besley and Coate (1999) show that disadvantages of the 
centralization in terms of welfare losses caused by heterogeneity of preferences disappear 
as long as the central government finances public expenditure through general taxation but 
local districts can receive different levels of local public goods. 
Moving away from the Pareto-efficient/social planner assumption, one must assume some 
collective decision-making rule usually based on the median voter mechanism and allowing 
comparison of benefits of majorities with costs of minorities. In these cases the decision to 
centralize/decentralize leaves someone better off and someone worse off, making welfare 
comparison dependent on specific value judgments (Persson, Roland and Tabellini 1996). 
Ellingsen (1998) develops a model where changes in the distribution of preferences across 
geographic regions and the relative size of regions affect costs and benefits of the decision 
to centralize or decentralize public policies. Bjorvatn and Cappellen (2003) drop the 
hypothesis that local communities are inhabited by people with relatively homogeneous 
tastes and  propose a model where people living in a country are not necessarily close in 
terms of preferences. Local or central decision making on public policies depends on the 
distribution of preferences, the degree of geographical segregation and the degree of 
                                                 
2 This result follows from the fact that, the average level of the public good correspond to the Pareto-efficient 
allocation when the shape of the demand curve for the public good is the same for all individuals along its 
relevant section. In this case welfare losses can be measured as the squared sum of the distance between the 
individual and the average level of the public good.  
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mobility. In particular, they show that, in a particular situation where minorities and 
majorities are symmetrically distributed across jurisdictions, the centralization may be 
welfare-superior with respect to the decentralization. This occurs when the median central 
voter is a moderate and the median local voter has fairly extreme preferences. In this case, 
assuming that welfare losses are convex, the centralized solution protects local minorities 
from extreme solutions at a smaller cost (for local majorities) in welfare terms. This result, 
obtained, as mentioned before, in a rather particular situation, is however interesting 
because it shows that, even in the absence of economies of scale and externalities, public 
policies do not necessarily have to be allocated at the lower level of government, as implied 
by the social planner approach. 
When the restrictive assumptions of the model of Bjorvatn and Cappelen are relaxed in 
order to include more realistic situations, it turns out to be more difficult to derive, on the 
theoretical ground, general conditions for the welfare dominance of centralization on 
decentralization. This issue can be fruitfully dealt with at empirical level. In particular, the 
approach here adopted aims in measuring the attitudes for public expenditures expressed 
by citizens living in a specific geographical and historical context and in comparing the 
welfare effects that the heterogeneity of individual preferences for public expenditures 
imply with the centralized and the decentralized solutions when a median voter mechanism 
of collective decision is assumed to work at both levels of government. 
 
 
4. Individual preferences for public expenditures in the European countries: empirical evidence  
 
In this section we present the data we use to give an empirical application to the theoretical 
approach presented in Section 3, and we discuss the general strategy here adopted to fit the 
data to the analysis of the role of individual preferences in the choice between 
centralized/decentralized provision of public services. 
 
4.1 The data 
The data used in this empirical application are taken from the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP). The ISSP is a continuing programme of cross-national surveys 
covering topics relevant for social science research such as social inequality, work 
orientations, changing role of family and gender, public intervention, and so on3. In 
particular, the survey Role of Government III, conducted in 1996-97 over the population 
of 23 different countries, is specifically devoted to the analysis of individual attitudes 
towards the scope of public action; the main tasks to be assigned to the government; the 
means of public intervention in terms of taxation, public expenditures, regulation; the role 
of trade unions and of the business community; the functioning of the democratic system; 
the participation in political issues.  
                                                 
3 A comprehensive presentation of ISSP is reported at www.gesis.org/en/data%5Fservice/issp. For two 
interesting applications of IISP data to the analysis of people’s attitudes towards redistribution accomplished 
by the government see Corneo and Gruner (2002), and Bernasconi (2004). 
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Survey questions V25-V32 are of particular interest for our analysis. They ask individuals 
whether they would like to see more or less government spending in a series of 8 different 
areas of public intervention: 1) “environment”, 2) “health”, 3) “police and law 
enforcement”, 4) “education”, 5) “military and defense”, 6) “old age pensions”, 7) 
“unemployment benefits”, and 8) “culture and arts”. Respondents can choose among 5 
different possible qualitative answers: “spend much less”, “spend less”, “spend the same as 
now”, “spend more”, “spend much more” together with a residual possibility “can’t 
choose”.. Moreover, in order to avoid their not considering individual costs, the 
respondents are warned that if they choose “spend much more” they might be subject to a 
tax increase to pay for it. In addition to these questions, the survey provides detailed 
information (even if not available for all the countries considered) about the socio-
economic characteristics of respondents such as gender, age, marital status, household 
composition, education level, occupation, family income, party affiliation, etc.  
If we exclude the new entrants in May 2004, the survey includes 7 EU member countries: 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Spain and France, that in total accounted 
for more than 75% of the EU population in 1996. After discarding those observations that 
do not carry complete information about the most relevant socio-economic characteristics 
of the respondents, the sample here considered totals more than 6,200 individual 
observations4. 
Table 1 reports the distributions of frequencies of the answers recorded by the survey 
relative to each combination of public expenditures category/country. Moreover, a 
distribution of frequencies corresponding to the sum of these countries (hereafter referred 
to as the EU) has been derived for each category of public expenditure as the weighted 
average of the distributions referred to each country, the weights given by the population 
share of that country over the total population of the EU.  
Even if the distribution of answers differs across countries and across categories of public 
expenditure, some common traits can be recognized. First of all, in less than half (46%) of 
the country/category of public expenditure cases the answer “the same”, which denotes a 
positive evaluation of the current level of provision, turns out to be the modal answer. On 
the contrary, in 45% of cases the relative majority of people require “more” public 
expenditure, whereas in the remaining 9% most people favour “less” public expenditure. 
Moreover, if we individually consider each category of public expenditure, for most public 
services the modal case is in favour of “more” expenditure in most of the countries, and 
this support is particularly strong in the case of “education” and “health” (respectively 6 
and 5 countries out of 7). The exceptions are “unemployment benefits”, and “culture and 
arts”, where in most of the countries a relative majority of people support the current level 
of public provision, and “military and defence”, where, on the contrary, in 4 countries out 
                                                 
4 The several missing values that affect the data reported in the ISSP survey have compelled a severe 
reduction in the size of the considered sample. This problem refers particularly to the information concerning 
individual and family income, that is affected by refusal to answer, misunderstanding and so on. Moreover,  
income data are recorded according to definitions that are sometimes different across countries (net or gross 
of taxes and social contributions, continuous or by intervals, etc.). 
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of 7 the modal case corresponds to a reduction (“less”) or a strong reduction (“much less”) 
of public intervention. Finally, when we flip through the countries, a highly differentiated 
scenario emerges. Sweden, France and Germany are countries where the relative majority 
of respondents are satisfied with the current levels of provision for the most public services 
(respectively 6 out of 8; 6 out of 8; 5 out of 8), whereas in Spain and Italy the modal answer 
is for an increase in public expenditure in most of the sectors (respectively 6 out of 8; 5 out 
of 8). 
In order better to appreciate the differences in the distributions of preferences across 
countries and sectors of public expenditure, it is worthwhile summing up those 
distributions by resorting to a summary index of dispersion. The relative index of 
dispersion for ordered variables proposed by Leti (1983, 295) d is appropriate to the case 
here considered, given the categorical but also inherently ordered nature of the variable 



















where k  denotes the number of possible outcomes and Fh  the relative cumulative 
frequency. d  is maximum ( 1=d ) (the dispersion of outcomes is maximum) when 
population is equally distributed in the two extreme cases (“spend much less” and “spend 
much more”). On the contrary, d  (and the dispersion) takes its minimum value ( 0=d ) 
when the whole population agree on the same answer, whatever it is. Table 2 reports the 
values of d   at each combination of public expenditure category/country.  
First of all, note that the values of d are relatively little differentiated across public 
expenditure categories and countries, always between 0.4 and 0.6. If we look at the sectors 
of public expenditure one by one, “military and defense”, “unemployment benefits” and 
“culture and arts” are the categories that show a dispersion of preferences higher in the 
average of the countries than the other public services6. In particular, the preferences 
expressed in Italy about “unemployment benefits”, in France about “culture and arts” and 
in Spain about “military and defense” are particularly polarized. On the contrary, “old age 
pensions” seems to be the sector where the preferences among people in each country 
seem to be less differentiated. Finally, at the level of individual countries, Great Britain is 
the country where preferences for public spending (in the average of all categories) are less 
dispersed, whereas in France people are more differentiated in their opinions about public 
intervention. 
                                                 
5 The Leti index of dispersion accounts not only for the distribution of frequencies but also for the ranking 
inherent in the possible answers (“spend much less”, “spend less”, “spend the same as now”, “spend more”, 
“spend much more”) and is therefore responsive to the distance between the various outcomes (for example,  
the difference between “spend much less” and “spend much more” is greater than between “spend much 
less” and “spend less”). 
6 The calculation of the average, and in general the comparison across categories and across counties, is 
however affected by the issues discussed in Section 4.2.  
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4.2 Empirical issues in dealing with survey data 
The distributions of frequencies recorded by the survey and reported in Table 1 cannot, 
however, be taken as an adequate measurement of the distributions of preferences for 
public expenditure in the different countries, and this for two different reasons that affect 
the data just presented. On one hand, the randomness associated with the small national 
samples of observations included in the survey requires that the phenomenon at stake be 
econometrically modelled and that the probabilities of the different outcomes be predicted 
from that model. The distributions of estimated probabilities for the sample on which we 
estimated the model obviously differ from the distributions of observed probabilities. In 
Section 4.3, we ran a series of regressions including among the explanatory variables, 
together with standard controls (sex, age, occupational status, income), a complete set of 
country-specific dummy variables. 
On the other hand, the comparability of the distributions of preferences across countries 
and categories of public expenditures is critical for the ultimate goal of this paper: to 
compare the welfare effects that the heterogeneity of individual preferences for public 
expenditures imply with the centralized and decentralized solutions. In this perspective, the 
data here considered suffer from what we would refer to as a “reference” problem. Indeed, 
the way in which the questions about the desired variations of public expenditures are 
formulated (see Section 4.1) implies that the answers are given by each respondent making 
reference to the current level of expenditures actually implemented in their own country. 
The consequence is that, for example, the answer “more” given by people living in a 
country where the level of public expenditure is quite low may not be compared with the 
same answer recorded in a country where public intervention is stronger but, to some 
extent (given the qualitative nature of the variable), with the answer “the same” eventually 
given in that country. A possible strategy to address this problem consists in generating 
out-of-sample predictions of the distributions of preferences for a sample that is different 
from the estimation sample in which the country-specific dummies are set equal to zero for 
all the considered countries. This means clearing the predicted probabilities from the effect 
produced by the nationality of respondents, by proceeding as if all observations were 
referred to the country excluded from the estimation in order to avoid the dummy trap (see 
Section 4.3). Clearly this approach is affected by a series of evident drawbacks. Firstly, it 
critically relies on the assumption that all the respondents living in a country experience the 
same level of public services, uniformly provided throughout the country, and, as a 
consequence, this common trait can be effectively captured by the country-specific dummy. 
Secondly, it assumes the level of public intervention to be the main determinant of the 
national identity, thus overshadowing the relevance of other common cultural, political, 





4.3 Estimation results 
According to the strategy described in Section 4.2, a series of ordered probit models has 
been distinctively estimated in order to analyze the individual attitudes toward each 
category of public expenditure recorded by the survey. 
The general form of the ordered probit model is: 
iiY ε+= βXi*  
where Y i*  is the unobserved variable measuring the variation of the j-th public expenditure 
category desired by the i-th respondent, Xi  a vector of explanatory variables, and iε  the 
error term assumed to be normally distributed across the observations. What we observe is 
a variable Y i  (corresponding to the answers to the relevant questions in the survey) such 
that:  
µ1
*0 ≤= YY ii if  
µµ 2
*
11 ≤<= YY ii if  
µµ 3
*
22 ≤<= YY ii if  
µµ 4
*
33 ≤<= YY ii if  
µ4
*4 >= YY ii if  
where µ ’s are unknown parameters (cut-points) to be estimated together with the vector 
β . Therefore, the probability of observing the k-th outcome corresponds to the probability 
that the estimated linear function plus the error term lies within the range of the relevant 
cut-points estimated for that outcome: 
)()0(Pr 1 βXi−Φ== µY iob  
)()()1(Pr 12 ββ XX ii −Φ−−Φ== µµY iob  
)()()2(Pr 23 ββ XX ii −Φ−−Φ== µµY iob  
)()()3(Pr 34 ββ XX ii −Φ−−Φ== µµY iob  
)(1)4(Pr 4 βXi−Φ−== µY iob  
where Φ  is the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
As stressed by Greene (2000, 878), the interpretation of the estimated coefficients of this 
model is far from obvious. The direction of the marginal effects of the regressors on the 
probabilities of observing the different outcomes may be different from the sign of the 
corresponding estimated coefficients. Therefore, the marginal effects of changes in the 







ob Y i  




ob Y i  




ob Y i  











ob Y i  
where φ  is the standard normal density. 
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Table 3 reports the marginal effects and their corresponding z-values calculated after the 
estimation of the 8 ordered probit models referred to each category of public expenditure 
considered in the survey.  
All the regressions use the same set of independent variables, including standard control 
variables available in the survey for all countries considered (sex, age, occupational status) 
together with a complete set of country-specific dummy variables. The variable income 
equals the difference between the natural logarithm of the repsondent’s income and the 
natural logarithm of the average income in the respondent’s country. In addition we have 
referred to two different questions included in the survey in order to capture the attitude of 
the respondents toward public intervention in general. The answers to the question "Does 
the government have too much power or too little power?" (V35) and those to the 
question "If the government had a choice between reducing social services or spending 
more on them, which do you think it should do?" (V56) have been used to define the 
explanatory variables “Power” and “Tax” respectively. A detailed description of the 
regressors is given in Table A.1 of the Appendix. In the interpretation of the estimation 
results in terms of marginal effects, note that in order to avoid the dummy trap one 
outcome for each dummy variable has been excluded from the regression. Therefore the 
marginal effects must be interpreted as marginal deviation from a reference type that can 
be described as male (sex = 1), aged 18-30 (age = 1), employee (occ = 1), resident in 
Germany (country = 1), that answers "Far too much power/Too much power" to the 
Question: "Does the government have too much power or too little power?", and that 
answers "Reduce taxes, even if this means spending less" to the question "If the 
government had a choice between reducing the or spending more on social services, which 
do you think it should do?". 
In the following, we summarize the main estimation results. As for the gender of the 
respondent, being female enhances the preferences for more public expenditures in 
“health”, “military and defense”, “old age pensions”, “unemployment benefits” and 
“culture and arts” (statistically significant marginal effects positive for “much less” and 
“less” outcomes and negative for “more”  and “much more” outcomes). 
As expected, the age of the respondent turns out to have effects of different sign on the 
various sectors of public intervention here considered. Getting old implies favouring more 
expenditure for “police and law enforcement”, for “military and defense”, and for “old age 
pensions”; and, on the contrary, less expenditure for “environment”, and for “education”. 
The other categories of public expenditure seem not to be significantly affected by age, 
except for “unemployment benefits” where the 60-75 years-old group supports a reduction 
of public intervention. 
Turning to the role of the occupational status, for many categories of public expenditures 
the corresponding coefficients are statistically non-significant. However, there are some 
exceptions. The status of self-employed implies (as against that of employee) stronger 
preferences for an increase of public expenditure for “environment”, and for a reduction 
of “unemployment benefits”. Finally, consistently with the expectations, belonging to the 
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group of “other” occupational positions (unemployed, student, retired, housewife, etc.) 
implies a request for more public expenditures in “unemployment benefits” and in “police 
and law”. 
Though care must be taken in interpreting the evidence on the role of family income (see 
note 4), the latter turns out to be powerful in accounting for individual attitudes toward 
public expenditures. In particular, rich people are more likely to support high expenditure 
for “environment”, “culture and arts” and “education”, but wealth reduces the probability 
of favouring more expenditure on “health”, “military and defense”, “old age pensions” and 
“unemployment benefits” (the last two categories to a large extent, too). These findings can 
be in some measure interpreted in terms of the standard economic differentiation between 
luxuries and necessities (respectively, the first and the second group of categories of public 
services). In particular, environment and culture are often seen as a kind of publicly 
provided services that meet second-level needs of population, being increasingly developed 
as real living standards rise. 
The evidence stemming from the two variables “Power” and “Tax” intending to capture 
the general attitudes for public intervention is to some extent more mixed. As for the 
variable “Power”, people feeling more sympathetic towards the government (government 
has too little power) favor more public spending in the sectors of “environment”, “police 
and law enforcement”, and “culture and arts”, but desire an expenditure reduction for 
“health”, “old age pensions” and “unemployment benefits”. The general picture is 
therefore that those backing public intervention require a switch in the composition of the 
public budget in favor of the more innovative sectors and to the detriment of the more 
traditional programs of the welfare state. Turning to the “Tax” variable, people who 
oppose the idea of the Minimal State and support a reinforcement in the fiscal exchange 
with the government ("Spend more, even if this means higher taxes") are for an increase in 
all the sectors of public expenditure, with only two exceptions — namely, in the case of 
“military and defense” (where the variable “Tax” displays a negative, statistically significant 
sign for an increase in public spending) and “police and law enforcement” (that, however, 
displays statistically non-significant effects). 
Many of the national dummy variables exhibit statistically significant coefficients. With 
respect to Germany (reference case), the marginal effects across categories of public 
expenditure and countries are fairly differentiated in terms of sign, size, and statistical 
significance. As mentioned before, this is the result of a wide array of cultural, political, and 
institutional  factors together with the differences in the current level of expenditures with 
reference to which national respondents have expressed their opinions. In summary, in the 
case of environment, people living in Great Britain, Italy, Sweden and France are more 
likely to support high expenditures for “environment”. Analogously, living in Great Britain, 
Italy, Ireland, Sweden and Spain enhances the preference for the public intervention in 
“health”, while the contrary happens in France. As for public spending in “police and law 
enforcement”, dummy variables denoting Great Britain and Ireland display positive 
coefficients with the “more” and “much more” cases, whereas Italy, Sweden and France 
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show the opposite response. People resident in Great Britain, Italy, Spain and France are in 
favour of more public expenditure in “education”. “Military and defense” expenditure is 
supported by those living in Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden and Spain, but not by Italians. 
Statistically significant positives on the probability of favoring more expenditure in “old age 
pensions” are recorded in Great Britain, Italy and Spain, but not in France. Living in Italy, 
Ireland and Spain is associated with the request for higher public spending in the sector of 
“unemployment benefits”, while dummy variables denoting Great Britain and France 
exhibit opposite signs. Finally, in the case of “culture and arts”, the country-effects are in 
favour of an increase in the amount of public intervention in Italy, Ireland, and Spain, as 
against in Great Britain. 
As sketched in Section 4.2, in order to address the “reference” problem and to make 
individual preferences comparable across countries, we rely on estimation results presented 
in Table 3 to generate the predicted distributions of preferences for a sample where all the 
national dummy variables are now set equal to zero. Given that Germany is, as mentioned 
before, the country excluded from the estimation to avoid the multicollinearity implied by 
the dummy trap, this is equivalent to assuming the whole sample as if it comprised only 
people living in Germany (and therefore fully comparable among themselves). Table A.2 
reports the distributions of preferences for public expenditures estimated and corrected for 




5. The welfare effects of the centralized/decentralized solutions 
 
The political economy literature of public expenditures is largely based on the median voter 
hypothesis (Persson and Tabellini 1999). Assuming that the outcome of majority voting 
corresponds to the choice of the median voter enables powerful simplification of the 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the collective choice mechanism, even if different 
strands of criticism have been levelled against this hypothesis (limitations on individual 
preferences, uni-dimensionality of policy space, etc.). In this Section we assume that a 
median voter mechanism of collective decision is assumed to work both at national and 
EU level in each sector of public expenditure. 
Using this simplified scheme we simulate a collective decision process which predict, for 
both the national and the EU level of government, the (qualitative) level of public 
intervention for each sector of expenditure. Each individual suffers a welfare loss if his/her 
choice is different with respect to the choice of the median voter. In the simulations 
presented in this section we contrast welfare losses expected by representative individuals 
of our data set when public expenditure on each function is decided (separately) by the 
national median voter, with welfare losses that the same set of individuals would bear were 
the public expenditure level for each function decided by the EU median voter. The 
welfare comparison of these two highly simplified allocations enables us to evaluate 
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whether, net of gains expected from economies of scale and internalization of externalities, 
a centralized provision would impose higher costs than the decentralized solution in terms 
of welfare to individual. 
Based on individual preferences for public expenditures estimated in Section 4.3 and 
transformed as discussed above, Table 4 shows the choices of the median voter for each 
country and for the EU.  
The choices of national median voters appear to be fairly homogeneous. In particular, it 
turns out that in five out of eight sectors the majority of national median voters support an 
increase of the expenditure (“environment”, “health”, “police and law enforcement”, 
“education”, “old age pension”), in two of them the (adjusted) current level 
(“unemployment benefits”, “culture and arts”) and, finally, in the case of “military and 
defense” a reduction of public spending. The same picture emerges when the choices of 
the median voter are considered in the context of the EU. In order to get a measure of the 
dispersion of collective choices across countries we compute, for each public function, the 
coefficient of variation of choices made by the national median voter. The coefficient is 
equal to zero in the case of “education”, where the choice by the median voter is the same 
overall. It is equal to 0.2235 for “heath” and to 0.2946 for “unemployment benefits”, 
where only one country takes a decision different from the others. It increases for other 
functions, reaching its maximum value in the case of “military and defence” expenditure. 
When the coefficient of variation is considered for the different sectors of public 
expenditure in each single country, Ireland has the lowest value (0.3497) and Grat Britain 
the maximum (0.6479). With the exception of these two countries the coefficient of 
variation of the EU is quite similar to those of remaining countries. 
The next step consists in deriving a measure of welfare losses suffered by each individual 
when the level of public expenditures chosen by the median voter. In order to make 
calculation possible at this stage, we have to assign a “quantitative” measure to the 
“qualitative” estimated preferences. We have decided to transform the qualitative scale of 
answers on the desired level of public expenditures into a linear series from one to five, 
where one identifies the option “spend much less”, two the option “less”, and so on. 
Moreover, following Bjorvatn and Cappellen (2003),  we have defined the welfare loss 
suffered by the i-th individual as: 
 
( )mi hhfLi −=  
 
where f is the loss function for each individual, hi is the desired choice of the individual i 
and hm is the choice of the median voter. Some critical points should be noted. In the 
empirical calculations we will assume that: i) the loss function is convex ( 0' >f  and 0'' >f ); 
ii) the specification of the loss function is identical for each individual. We have tried 
different specifications for the loss function. Although results are different in their absolute 




( )mi hhiL −= 3  
 
Table 5 reports the welfare loss in this way derived in the case of decentralized and 
centralized solution. The figures reported in the table are determined as the sum of 
individual losses for any combination country/sector of public expenditure. In the upper 
section of the table welfare losses are computed with respect to the corresponding national 
median voter choice. The lower section of the table does the same in the case that the 
collective choice is taken by the EU median voter. In the last columns to the right-hand 
side (EU) welfare losses are summed across the countries respectively in the decentralized 
and the centralized solution. 
By comparing the results presented in the EU column for the decentralized and the 
centralized solutions we obtain a measure of the gain/losses expected from the 
centralization of a specific public function. Only for “health” does a clear dominance for 
the centralized solution emerge. For “employment benefits” and “education” the 
comparison of the two solutions displays a situation of substantial neutrality, whereas in all 
the remaining sectors the uniform level of expenditure chosen by the EU median voter 
implies a loss in welfare terms that in some cases, in particular “police and law 
enforcement” and “culture and arts”, results to be particularly relevant. 
Finally, the welfare effects of the centralization of public policies can be measured for each 
single country. In this case we contrast the “sum of public expenditures” measured in the 
two solutions. Unsurprisingly, the comparison shows that the complete centralization of 
public policies would be costly for all the countries. Welfare losses are particularly heavy in 
the case of Great Britain, Italy and Ireland. France holds an intermediate position, whereas 
the welfare losses would be almost negligible in Germany and Spain. 
The results now discussed at least partially contradict the policy recommandations put 
forward by the existing economic literature that, following a more qualitative approch than 
what here adopted, tries to consider consumer preferences in a wider theorethical and 
empirical framework including economies of scale and scope, and  territorial externalities. 
For example, Bertola et al. (1999) claim that in the case of social policies providing 
contingent insurance (including unemployment benefits and certain forms of health 
insurance) EU interference should not go beyond the specification of minimum 
contribution rates and regulation of the of the overall character of the scheme, excluding in 
particular the desidarability of a central co-financing of expenditures. More generally, 
Breuss and Eller (2003) point out education and research, on the one hand, and social 
policies, on the other hand, as remarkable examples of public functions where the optimal 
assignment across different levels of government is discussed contradictorily by the 
literature, depending on the research focus the different authors have chosen. In the case 
of education some contributions highlight relevant arguments in favor of decentralization, 
including consideration of heterogeneous local preferences, effects of inter-jurisdictional 
competition or limited cross-national externalities (Alesina et al. 2001; Persson et al. 1996). 
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On the contrary, other authors find reasons supporting EU responsibility in the field of 
education for example emphasizing the adverse effects that national and sub-national 
provision could produce on the formation of human capital (Ter-Minassian 1997). In the 
case of social policies as well, heterogeneity of local preferences and inter-jursdictional 
competition are recalled as arguments in favor of  national and sub-national competencies, 
whereas the danger of social dumping across countries and the role of social risk-pooling 





6. Concluding remarks 
 
The theory of fiscal federalism looks at the heterogeneity of preferences across individuals 
living in a jurisdiction, together with interregional spillovers and economies of scale, as a 
guide for the optimal assignment of competencies between central and local governments. 
When applied to the issue of assignment of public expenditure competencies between the 
EU and the member countries, this principle implies that a social planner aiming to welfare 
maximization decides to centralize if the benefits deriving from economies of scale and 
internalization of externalities compensate costs that a large union of countries causes to 
citizens in term of heterogeneity of preferences. Moving away from the restrictive 
assumptions of this theoretical approach it turns out to be more difficult to derive clear and 
unambiguous conditions for the welfare dominance of centralization on decentralization. 
In this paper we tried to deal with this issue from an empirical perspective. In particular, 
data from a large international survey (ISSP) are used to estimate a series of econometric 
models in order to make individual attitudes for public expenditures representative and 
comparable across different categories (environment, health, police and law enforcement, 
education, military and defense, old age pensions, unemployment benefits, culture and arts) 
and different EU countries (Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Spain and 
France). Estimation results confirms the explanatory power of social, economic and 
demographic factors such as sex, age, occupational status and relative position in the 
income distribution in shaping individual preferences for public expenditures, with effects 
that are generally consistent with the theory. Political and ideological attitude for public 
intervention in the economy seems to back a switch in the composition of the public 
budget in favor of the more innovative sectors and to detriment of the more traditional 
programs. Many of the national dummy variables exhibit statistically significant 
coefficients, resulting from the diversity  in cultural, political, and institutional factors 
together with the differences in the current level of expenditures with reference to which 
national respondents expressed their opinions. This makes possible inter alia to clear the 
predicted distributions of preferences from the effect of this “reference” problem by 
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generating out-of-sample predictions for a sample in which all the country-specific 
dummies are set equal to zero. 
In the second section of the paper these distributions of preferences for public 
expenditures (estimated and corrected for the “reference” problem) have been used to 
simulate the functioning of a collective decision mechanism based on the median voter 
hypothesis both at the level of each country and of the sum of these countries, with the 
aim of mimicking the national and the EU solution in the allocation of competencies. By 
assuming an individual convex loss function and comparing the welfare effects in 
centralized and decentralized solutions, we derive a welfare criterion in order to evaluate 
which sectors of public expenditure should more efficiently be primarily assigned to the 
EU level or to the national governments. The empirical analysis reveals that in some 
sectors of public expenditure (health, education, employment benefits) the assignment of 
responsibilities to the EU level welfare dominates (or is close to dominating) 
decentralization, even in the absence of economies of scale and interregional spillovers. In 
all the remaining areas of public intervention centralization of public policies implies a net 
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Tab.1 Preferences for public expenditure categories - distribution of observed frequencies
country
public 
expenditure Germany Great Britain Italy Ireland Sweden Spain France EU
much less 0.004 0.010 0.015 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.036 0.014
less 0.052 0.041 0.076 0.052 0.044 0.046 0.081 0.059
the same 0.347 0.487 0.318 0.404 0.438 0.284 0.409 0.376
more 0.366 0.373 0.431 0.413 0.372 0.482 0.328 0.388
much more 0.231 0.089 0.159 0.124 0.141 0.184 0.145 0.164
obs 1158 608 851 775 804 1221 826 6243
much less 0.005 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.037 0.010
less 0.070 0.005 0.036 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.118 0.051
the same 0.399 0.070 0.201 0.154 0.230 0.171 0.381 0.258
more 0.329 0.471 0.467 0.478 0.501 0.556 0.292 0.411
much more 0.196 0.453 0.287 0.358 0.256 0.259 0.172 0.270
obs 1166 633 865 779 805 1275 838 6361
much less 0.011 0.006 0.055 0.004 0.014 0.005 0.051 0.025
less 0.056 0.018 0.170 0.019 0.045 0.043 0.086 0.073
the same 0.349 0.222 0.445 0.204 0.476 0.288 0.470 0.359
more 0.384 0.528 0.275 0.389 0.371 0.487 0.292 0.387
much more 0.201 0.227 0.056 0.384 0.094 0.177 0.101 0.156
obs 1162 618 834 779 800 1266 828 6287
much less 0.013 0.002 0.016 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.037 0.014
less 0.064 0.010 0.037 0.018 0.030 0.016 0.059 0.040
the same 0.394 0.129 0.234 0.333 0.360 0.209 0.280 0.266
more 0.370 0.522 0.474 0.415 0.438 0.532 0.386 0.445
much more 0.160 0.337 0.238 0.231 0.172 0.240 0.238 0.235
obs 1163 626 862 780 803 1265 842 6341
much less 0.299 0.102 0.410 0.052 0.198 0.202 0.316 0.267
less 0.357 0.257 0.309 0.218 0.327 0.370 0.339 0.325
the same 0.258 0.464 0.204 0.487 0.343 0.272 0.265 0.296
more 0.064 0.144 0.057 0.179 0.106 0.119 0.057 0.086
much more 0.023 0.033 0.020 0.064 0.026 0.038 0.023 0.027
obs 1148 606 854 770 804 1253 841 6276
much less 0.003 0.005 0.024 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.035 0.013
less 0.054 0.006 0.054 0.006 0.025 0.020 0.081 0.044
the same 0.506 0.179 0.242 0.258 0.429 0.289 0.570 0.373
more 0.315 0.519 0.504 0.442 0.399 0.514 0.207 0.398
much more 0.123 0.291 0.176 0.294 0.146 0.175 0.107 0.171
obs 1151 632 847 776 797 1271 828 6302
much less 0.027 0.054 0.089 0.017 0.027 0.024 0.136 0.064
less 0.184 0.155 0.115 0.112 0.146 0.082 0.242 0.161
the same 0.502 0.432 0.293 0.406 0.435 0.351 0.422 0.412
more 0.216 0.283 0.369 0.314 0.300 0.399 0.149 0.272
much more 0.070 0.076 0.135 0.151 0.092 0.143 0.051 0.091
obs 1151 607 846 774 804 1252 839 6273
much less 0.114 0.307 0.049 0.079 0.161 0.015 0.193 0.142
less 0.300 0.343 0.098 0.169 0.291 0.093 0.230 0.229
the same 0.446 0.269 0.418 0.524 0.407 0.404 0.388 0.390
more 0.117 0.074 0.332 0.171 0.100 0.378 0.143 0.187
much more 0.023 0.008 0.103 0.057 0.041 0.110 0.046 0.052
obs 1140 610 843 776 797 1232 830 6228
environment
health









Tab.2 Preferences for public expenditure categories - relative Leti index
country
public expenditure Germany Great Britain Italy Ireland Sweden Spain France EU
environment 0.475 0.388 0.474 0.421 0.424 0.424 0.512 0.456
health 0.482 0.326 0.442 0.379 0.391 0.357 0.558 0.439
police and law enforcement 0.477 0.391 0.500 0.439 0.403 0.419 0.496 0.458
education 0.467 0.357 0.453 0.429 0.409 0.380 0.538 0.443
military and defense 0.536 0.499 0.535 0.490 0.548 0.574 0.538 0.534
old age pensions 0.410 0.376 0.457 0.408 0.399 0.383 0.448 0.415
unemployment benefits 0.463 0.517 0.609 0.506 0.491 0.489 0.561 0.524
culture and arts 0.486 0.524 0.510 0.488 0.544 0.458 0.597 0.517
Tab. 3 Oprobit estimation results (marginal effects)
n. obs
log likelihood
variable dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z
sex* -0.001 -1.09 -0.002 -3.60 0.000 0.40 -0.001 -1.67 -0.020 -2.23 -0.002 -3.34 -0.009 -3.56 -0.019 -4.04
cage2* 0.003 3.29 -0.001 -1.89 -0.002 -1.01 -0.002 -2.19 0.005 0.38 -0.002 -3.13 0.000 -0.05 0.002 0.34
cage3* 0.008 7.76 -0.001 -2.26 -0.007 -5.07 0.002 1.91 -0.058 -4.95 -0.002 -3.54 -0.002 -0.59 0.003 0.44
cage4* 0.019 11.55 0.000 -0.53 -0.012 -7.72 0.007 3.71 -0.113 -9.19 -0.005 -6.14 0.016 3.28 0.014 1.73
cage5* 0.027 7.04 0.001 0.90 -0.011 -5.82 0.012 2.56 -0.153 -9.30 -0.002 -1.19 0.016 1.59 -0.015 -1.16
power2* -0.001 -1.49 0.003 4.93 0.001 0.92 0.002 2.08 0.002 0.21 0.005 5.62 0.010 3.37 -0.034 -7.14
power3* -0.003 -2.97 0.003 3.05 -0.005 -3.41 -0.001 -0.51 -0.002 -0.16 0.004 2.97 0.022 4.01 -0.022 -3.44
tax* -0.008 -12.45 -0.005 -6.59 0.000 0.30 -0.010 -8.22 0.074 7.63 -0.004 -6.13 -0.036 -12.51 -0.050 -10.59
occ2* -0.003 -3.60 0.001 0.69 0.004 1.45 -0.002 -1.27 0.018 1.03 0.002 1.84 0.036 5.03 -0.013 -1.74
occ3* -0.002 -2.18 -0.001 -1.31 -0.004 -2.53 -0.002 -2.35 0.007 0.58 -0.001 -1.26 -0.011 -3.33 -0.008 -1.43
linc -0.002 -3.16 0.002 5.31 -0.001 -0.92 -0.002 -2.80 0.023 2.98 0.005 6.79 0.026 10.74 -0.021 -5.10
country2* 0.018 10.63 -0.006 -6.73 -0.009 -6.52 -0.011 -9.00 -0.181 -18.83 -0.007 -7.41 0.016 3.15 0.160 11.56
country3* 0.006 5.41 -0.004 -6.14 0.052 9.45 -0.007 -6.85 0.062 4.24 -0.004 -5.91 -0.021 -7.15 -0.096 -21.84
country4* 0.007 1.71 -0.004 -6.19 -0.013 -6.76 -0.006 -3.05 -0.190 -10.47 -0.006 -6.81 -0.025 -4.04 -0.047 -3.50
country5* 0.008 3.01 -0.003 -5.46 0.016 2.58 -0.003 -1.91 -0.093 -4.35 -0.003 -2.53 -0.013 -2.27 0.020 1.25
country6* 0.002 2.17 -0.004 -6.19 -0.004 -2.29 -0.008 -7.60 -0.107 -9.47 -0.005 -6.51 -0.026 -9.29 -0.104 -23.62
country7* 0.015 10.65 0.003 3.17 0.026 7.17 -0.004 -4.36 -0.006 -0.45 0.005 3.88 0.042 7.15 0.006 0.89
sex* -0.003 -1.09 -0.008 -4.02 0.001 0.40 -0.003 -1.68 -0.004 -2.19 -0.007 -3.56 -0.019 -3.58 -0.022 -4.02
cage2* 0.013 3.16 -0.005 -1.92 -0.004 -1.01 -0.005 -2.20 0.001 0.39 -0.008 -3.26 0.000 -0.05 0.002 0.34
cage3* 0.033 6.83 -0.006 -2.32 -0.019 -5.16 0.006 1.96 -0.014 -3.95 -0.009 -3.73 -0.004 -0.59 0.003 0.44
cage4* 0.066 9.11 -0.002 -0.53 -0.032 -8.32 0.016 4.09 -0.037 -5.99 -0.019 -7.83 0.030 3.48 0.016 1.79
cage5* 0.085 5.47 0.007 0.94 -0.031 -5.38 0.025 2.93 -0.080 -4.88 -0.006 -1.16 0.029 1.75 -0.018 -1.08
power2* -0.004 -1.50 0.017 6.59 0.003 0.92 0.005 2.13 0.000 0.21 0.018 7.31 0.019 3.49 -0.041 -6.88
power3* -0.013 -3.18 0.015 3.53 -0.014 -3.31 -0.002 -0.50 0.000 -0.16 0.012 3.30 0.040 4.51 -0.028 -3.16
tax* -0.035 -11.41 -0.028 -11.68 0.001 0.30 -0.024 -10.73 0.013 7.04 -0.016 -7.92 -0.076 -13.92 -0.060 -10.35
occ2* -0.017 -3.99 0.003 0.71 0.009 1.51 -0.004 -1.24 0.003 1.20 0.008 1.94 0.061 6.05 -0.017 -1.65
occ3* -0.008 -2.18 -0.003 -1.33 -0.009 -2.57 -0.006 -2.39 0.001 0.59 -0.003 -1.27 -0.022 -3.37 -0.010 -1.43
linc -0.008 -3.14 0.013 7.10 -0.002 -0.92 -0.005 -2.87 0.004 2.90 0.018 9.73 0.053 11.5 -0.024 -5.07
country2* 0.062 8.39 -0.036 -15.51 -0.026 -6.63 -0.030 -13.31 -0.090 -10.14 -0.029 -13.24 0.031 3.43 0.109 18.47
country3* 0.025 4.85 -0.023 -9.69 0.095 12.98 -0.018 -7.84 0.008 6.06 -0.017 -7.51 -0.048 -6.89 -0.152 -19.52
country4* 0.027 1.50 -0.029 -9.44 -0.041 -5.99 -0.016 -2.77 -0.131 -4.71 -0.027 -9.23 -0.062 -3.26 -0.070 -2.72
country5* 0.030 2.61 -0.022 -6.71 0.035 2.99 -0.009 -1.82 -0.035 -2.74 -0.011 -2.43 -0.030 -2.06 0.022 1.37
country6* 0.010 2.08 -0.023 -9.77 -0.009 -2.25 -0.021 -9.11 -0.035 -6.23 -0.019 -8.86 -0.062 -9.09 -0.168 -21.93
country7* 0.054 8.55 0.013 3.58 0.055 8.96 -0.011 -4.52 -0.001 -0.43 0.016 4.46 0.071 8.61 0.007 0.91
sex* -0.009 -1.09 -0.031 -4.07 0.003 0.40 -0.013 -1.68 0.013 2.23 -0.032 -3.61 -0.010 -3.49 0.008 3.87
cage2* 0.034 3.34 -0.019 -1.89 -0.009 -0.99 -0.022 -2.16 -0.003 -0.38 -0.038 -3.17 0.000 -0.05 -0.001 -0.34
cage3* 0.079 8.13 -0.024 -2.26 -0.049 -4.85 0.021 2.03 0.038 4.93 -0.044 -3.59 -0.002 -0.58 -0.001 -0.43
cage4* 0.128 13.63 -0.007 -0.52 -0.091 -7.33 0.056 4.62 0.073 9.30 -0.106 -7.22 0.013 4.44 -0.007 -1.58
cage5* 0.126 11.92 0.023 1.00 -0.098 -4.17 0.078 3.69 0.091 12.47 -0.029 -1.07 0.011 2.84 0.005 1.60
power2* -0.012 -1.49 0.059 7.22 0.007 0.93 0.017 2.17 -0.001 -0.21 0.077 8.32 0.010 3.59 0.013 6.50
power3* -0.038 -2.92 0.049 3.98 -0.037 -3.04 -0.006 -0.50 0.002 0.16 0.051 3.79 0.014 7.00 0.007 4.79
tax* -0.100 -12.15 -0.107 -13.50 0.002 0.30 -0.097 -12.50 -0.048 -7.60 -0.078 -8.44 -0.046 11.05 0.019 8.11
occ2* -0.052 -3.53 0.010 0.72 0.019 1.60 -0.016 -1.20 -0.011 -1.04 0.033 2.12 0.016 8.53 0.005 2.14
occ3* -0.021 -2.18 -0.013 -1.33 -0.023 -2.57 -0.023 -2.40 -0.004 -0.58 -0.014 -1.27 -0.012 -3.28 0.004 1.43
linc -0.021 -3.15 0.050 7.44 -0.006 -0.92 -0.019 -2.90 -0.015 -2.97 0.086 11.01 0.029 9.77 0.009 4.70
country2* 0.117 12.90 -0.189 -19.38 -0.073 -5.71 -0.156 -14.46 0.108 19.76 -0.190 -13.81 0.012 4.76 -0.110 -9.90
country3* 0.060 5.69 -0.099 -9.23 0.136 21.86 -0.081 -7.46 -0.040 -4.26 -0.092 -6.89 -0.036 -5.21 -0.028 -3.94
country4* 0.059 1.89 -0.164 -6.51 -0.147 -4.04 -0.077 -2.28 0.097 20.67 -0.209 -5.88 -0.061 -2.12 0.000 0.05
country5* 0.066 3.36 -0.107 -5.29 0.065 4.01 -0.038 -1.66 0.060 4.58 -0.058 -2.09 -0.021 -1.62 -0.011 -1.09
country6* 0.025 2.20 -0.099 -9.29 -0.023 -2.14 -0.095 -8.81 0.069 9.52 -0.110 -8.27 -0.050 -6.58 -0.041 -5.15
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Tab. 3 Oprobit estimation results (marginal effects)
culture and artsenvironment health police and law enforcement education
military and 
defense old age pensions
unemployment 
benefits
variable dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z dy/dx z
sex* 0.005 1.09 0.005 3.70 -0.002 -0.40 0.004 1.68 0.008 2.22 0.017 3.60 0.023 3.58 0.025 4.03
cage2* -0.020 -3.13 0.003 2.11 0.006 1.01 0.006 2.35 -0.002 -0.39 0.019 3.34 0.000 0.05 -0.003 -0.34
cage3* -0.052 -6.89 0.003 2.66 0.030 5.41 -0.006 -1.84 0.024 4.55 0.022 3.86 0.005 0.59 -0.004 -0.44
cage4* -0.104 -9.71 0.001 0.56 0.047 9.80 -0.021 -3.60 0.052 7.38 0.044 9.47 -0.037 -3.51 -0.018 -1.81
cage5* -0.130 -6.02 -0.005 -0.80 0.041 8.85 -0.038 -2.52 0.088 6.04 0.014 1.19 -0.036 -1.77 0.021 1.08
power2* 0.007 1.51 -0.012 -5.29 -0.005 -0.92 -0.005 -2.06 -0.001 -0.21 -0.044 -7.67 -0.024 -3.48 0.046 6.90
power3* 0.018 3.37 -0.013 -2.85 0.022 3.50 0.002 0.52 0.001 0.16 -0.031 -3.35 -0.049 -4.59 0.032 3.12
tax* 0.052 12.01 0.014 5.80 -0.002 -0.30 0.023 8.95 -0.027 -7.69 0.040 8.50 0.094 14.25 0.067 10.29
occ2* 0.024 4.46 -0.002 -0.65 -0.014 -1.49 0.004 1.42 -0.006 -1.07 -0.019 -1.95 -0.074 -6.25 0.019 1.64
occ3* 0.012 2.18 0.002 1.33 0.015 2.58 0.006 2.39 -0.003 -0.59 0.008 1.28 0.027 3.37 0.011 1.43
linc 0.012 3.14 -0.009 -5.54 0.004 0.92 0.005 2.83 -0.009 -2.97 -0.046 -10.42 -0.066 -11.50 0.027 5.11
country2* -0.098 -8.88 -0.053 -5.85 0.038 7.68 -0.012 -1.99 0.101 12.49 0.050 14.14 -0.038 -3.48 -0.127 -17.81
country3* -0.040 -4.83 -0.001 -0.36 -0.158 -14.65 0.010 5.63 -0.021 -4.59 0.039 8.72 0.060 6.85 0.178 18.73
country4* -0.042 -1.49 -0.060 -2.13 0.042 8.47 0.005 0.74 0.129 5.88 0.027 1.88 0.077 3.40 0.080 2.62
country5* -0.048 -2.60 -0.014 -1.39 -0.060 -2.97 0.007 3.51 0.045 3.40 0.025 2.70 0.037 2.06 -0.024 -1.37
country6* -0.015 -2.05 -0.001 -0.30 0.015 2.30 0.010 4.22 0.049 7.69 0.044 10.76 0.077 9.12 0.197 20.91
country7* -0.085 -8.95 -0.011 -2.93 -0.093 -9.30 0.009 5.96 0.002 0.44 -0.040 -4.58 -0.086 -8.99 -0.008 -0.91
sex* 0.008 1.09 0.036 4.07 -0.003 -0.40 0.014 1.68 0.003 2.21 0.024 3.60 0.015 3.54 0.008 3.94
cage2* -0.030 -3.38 0.022 1.87 0.009 0.99 0.024 2.13 -0.001 -0.39 0.028 3.10 0.000 0.05 -0.001 -0.34
cage3* -0.068 -8.34 0.027 2.22 0.046 4.73 -0.022 -2.06 0.011 4.20 0.033 3.48 0.003 0.59 -0.001 -0.44
cage4* -0.109 -13.83 0.008 0.52 0.088 6.86 -0.057 -4.85 0.026 6.13 0.086 6.56 -0.022 -3.68 -0.006 -1.87
cage5* -0.108 -10.43 -0.026 -1.04 0.099 3.71 -0.077 -4.04 0.054 4.44 0.022 1.03 -0.020 -1.98 0.008 1.01
power2* 0.011 1.48 -0.066 -7.38 -0.006 -0.93 -0.019 -2.18 0.000 -0.21 -0.056 -8.46 -0.015 -3.56 0.016 6.36
power3* 0.035 2.83 -0.053 -4.20 0.034 2.95 0.007 0.49 0.000 0.16 -0.036 -3.97 -0.027 -5.19 0.012 2.87
tax* 0.092 11.99 0.126 13.39 -0.002 -0.31 0.109 12.32 -0.011 -7.11 0.058 8.28 0.065 12.59 0.024 9.18
occ2* 0.049 3.37 -0.011 -0.73 -0.017 -1.62 0.018 1.18 -0.003 -1.10 -0.023 -2.20 -0.038 -7.48 0.007 1.56
occ3* 0.019 2.17 0.015 1.33 0.020 2.56 0.024 2.39 -0.001 -0.59 0.010 1.27 0.017 3.36 0.004 1.42
linc 0.019 3.16 -0.057 -7.52 0.005 0.92 0.020 2.90 -0.004 -2.94 -0.063 -11.10 -0.042 -11.46 0.009 4.98
country2* -0.099 -13.09 0.284 15.16 0.070 5.42 0.210 11.93 0.061 8.84 0.175 11.09 -0.022 -3.82 -0.033 -14.58
country3* -0.051 -5.86 0.126 8.34 -0.125 -21.26 0.096 6.84 -0.009 -4.67 0.074 6.32 0.045 5.78 0.098 12.04
country4* -0.050 -1.96 0.257 4.61 0.159 3.29 0.095 2.00 0.095 3.65 0.214 4.14 0.071 2.28 0.036 2.03
country5* -0.056 -3.48 0.146 4.41 -0.056 -4.04 0.043 1.57 0.023 2.87 0.046 1.93 0.027 1.77 -0.008 -1.47
country6* -0.022 -2.24 0.127 8.45 0.021 2.11 0.114 8.03 0.024 6.45 0.090 7.48 0.061 7.29 0.116 13.10
country7* -0.092 -12.48 -0.048 -4.13 -0.086 -12.73 0.053 4.05 0.001 0.44 -0.045 -5.53 -0.045 -10.19 -0.003 -0.92










Tab.4 Choices by the median voter
country
public expenditure Germany Great Britain Italy Ireland Sweden Spain France EU
environment more the same more more more more the same more
health more much more more more more more more more
police and law enforcement more more the same more the same more the same more
education more more more more more more more more
military and defense less the same less the same less less less less
old age pensions the same more more more more more the same more
unemployment benefits the same the same the same the same the same more the same the same
culture and arts the same less the same the same the same the same the same the same
Tab.5 Welfare loss in the decentralized and the centralized solutions
country
public expenditure Germany Great Britain Italy Ireland Sweden Spain France EU
environment 88215 91974 75695 5389 12298 42268 85452 401292
health 113806 92465 48634 2845 7584 32262 102174 399770
police and law enforcement 103119 54542 78150 2898 14271 44951 84597 382528
education 134190 44112 58497 4250 11370 36269 76416 365104
military and defense 131455 121799 72891 7638 20896 93176 94790 542644
old age pensions 114689 41710 52140 2756 9584 33536 69332 323747
unemployment benefits 123675 94594 97143 7114 14268 73786 96805 507385
culture and arts 140028 69592 90616 5463 15993 70587 107872 500151
sum of public expenditures 949178 610787 573766 38352 106263 426835 717439 3422621
country
public expenditure Germany Great Britain Italy Ireland Sweden Spain France Europe 
environment 88215 101630 75695 5389 12298 42268 108891 434386
health 113806 41901 48634 2845 7584 32262 102174 349206
police and law enforcement 103119 54542 193480 2898 16022 44951 138540 553552
education 134190 44112 58497 4250 11370 36269 76416 365104
military and defense 131455 220597 72891 18442 20896 93176 94790 652247
old age pensions 115730 41710 52140 2756 9584 33536 110351 365806
unemployment benefits 123675 94594 97143 7114 14268 78373 96805 511972
culture and arts 140028 174218 90616 5463 15993 70587 107872 604777
centralized solution
decentralized solution
Table A.1 Description of variables
Sex sex* 1 = male
2 = female
Age cage_1* 1 = 18-30
cage_2* 2 = 31-45
cage_3* 3 = 46-60
cage_4* 4 = 60-75
cage_5* 5 = > 75
Occupational status occ_1* 1 = employee
occ_2* 2 = self-employed
occ_3* 3 = other (unemployed, student, retired, housewife, etc.)
Log of monthly family income linc Log of the repsondent’s income minus 
log of the average income in the respondent’s country
Country country_1* 1 = Germany
country_2* 2 = Great Britain
country_3* 3 = Italy
country_4* 4= Ireland
country_5* 5 = Sweden
country_6* 6 = Spain
country_7* 7 = France
power_1* 1 = "Far too much power/Too much power"
power_2* 2 = "About the right amount of power"
power_3* 3 = "Too little power/Far too little power"
tax* 1 = "Reduce taxes, even if this means spending less"
2 = "Spend more, even if this means higher taxes"
(*) dummy variable
Question: "Does the government have too much power or too little 
power?"
Question: "If the government had a choice between reducing the or 
spending more on social services, which do you think it should do?"
